This paper studies auctions with a temporary Buy-It-Now (BIN) price using a two-stage model. In the first stage, a group of bidders (early bidders) are offered a "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) option to purchase the item immediately at a listed price (BIN price). If no early bidder accepts the BIN price, the BIN option disappears and the second stage starts with an additional group of bidders (late bidders). Both early and later bidders then participate in a second-price sealed-bid auction. We establish that when bidders are risk neutral or risk averse, if the seller sets the BIN price low enough, an early bidder will accept the BIN price only if his valuation is higher than a unique equilibrium cutoff valuation. Other things being equal, the cutoff valuation decreases as bidders' degree of risk aversion increases and increases as the number of early bidders increases. We found that facing risk neutral bidders, the seller sets a BIN price high enough such that no bidder will accept it thus the seller revenue is the same as in a second-price sealed-bid auction without a BIN pirce. When bidders are risk averse, by setting an appropriate BIN price, the seller can obtain a higher expected revenue in a two-stage BIN auction than in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction with the same reserve price, and the expected revenue increases as the number of early bidders decreases. These results may help explain the popularity of temporary BIN auctions in online auction sites such as eBay.
Introduction
In recent years, an auction format called "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auction has appeared in many auction sites such as eBay, Yahoo and Ubid. While a typical online auction takes the format of a second-price open-bid English auction, in a BIN auction, the bidders are allowed to buy the items at a fixed "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) price set by the seller and end the auction immediately. In Yahoo's "Buy Now" auction, a permanent BIN remains valid during the entire course of the auction. However, in eBay's "Buy-It-Now" (BIN) auction, the BIN price is temporary and disappears as soon as any bid is made at or above the reserve price. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the current literature related to the BIN auctions and discuss the contributions of this paper relative to the existing literature. We present our model in section 3, in which we characterize the bidders' equilibrium strategies (in section 3.1) , analyze the seller's optimization problem and identify the conditions under which a BIN auction raises more seller revenue than a second-price sealed-bid auction (in section 3.2). Section 4 contains the conclusion of this paper.
Literature Review
Several studies have investigated the BIN auctions theoretically. Budish and Takeyama (2001) showed that a seller facing two risk-averse bidders may imporve expected profit by using an optimal permanent BIN price. Hidvegi et al. (2006) extended the model with an arbitary number of bidders and continuous valuation distribution and showed that the seller receives higher expected revenue in an auction with a permanent BIN price than in a standard second-price auction, when buyers are risk averse.
Reynolds and Wooders (2005) characterized equilibrium bidding strategies in both temporary and permanent BIN auctions. They showed that for both auctions, when bidders are risk averse, by setting an appropriate BIN price, a seller can raise higher revenue than in a second-price sealed-bid auction. Mathews and Katzman (2006) considered the temporary BIN auctions with risk neutral bidders and a risk averse seller. They found that when seller is risk averse, setting a BIN price may result in a Pareto improvement compared to a sealed bid second price auction. Mathews (2004) studied the impact of time discounting on the BIN auctions.They found that time discounting by either the seller or the bidders can lead to the seller choosing a BIN price which results in the option being exercised with postitive probability.
All the paper mentioned above assumed that all biders enter the auction at the same time and are all offered a BIN option. However, one important feature of a temporary BIN price auction is that, if anyone places a bid higher than the reserve price, the BIN price disappears. Therefore, all bidders entering afterwards will not be able to observe the BIN price, thus they participate the auction as in a standard auction. This creates an information heterogeneity among the bidders that early bidders have observed the BIN price, while late bidders have no information about the BIN price. For the bidders who arrive early and observe the BIN price, their bids will never exceed the BIN price. Gupta and Gallien (2005) formulated a model featuring time-sensitive bidders with uniform valuations and Poisson arivals. They solved the problem of maximizing seller's utility by simulation and showed that the permanent BIN price auction leads to higher seller's utility than the temporary BIN price auction. However, they assumed that the seller maximizes his utility only by optimally pricing the BIN price, without considering the reserve price.
While the BIN price sets the upper-bound for the winning bid, the reserve price sets the lower-bound for the winning bid. In a standard English auction, a revenue maximizing seller should always set a reserve price that exceeds his value (Myerson 1981 ).
Ivanova-Stenzel and Kroger (2008) considered a situation when the seller offer the BIN price only to one bidder called bidder one. If bidder one accepts the BIN price then the sale takes place at this price. If bidder one rejects the BIN price, a second-price sealed bid auction with no reserve price starts with n bidders. They characterized equilibrium strategy for bidder one but not for the seller. Furthermore, they assume the reserve price is always 0 when solving the equilibrium. The internet auctions normally last for more than a week, thus it is unlikely that there is only one bidder who has observed the BIN price and has the opportunity to purchase the item immediately. Therefore, it is important to extend to the more general model where the number of bidders who are offered the BIN option is arbitrary.
There are also some empirical and experimental studies investigating the BIN auctions. Shahriar and Wooders (2007) found that a suitably chosen BIN price raises seller revenue with risk averse bidders. However the BIN price is accepted too frequently compared with the theoretical prediction when assuming all bidders are offered the BIN option. IvanovaStenzel and Kroger (2008) studied BIN auction in a sequential selling mechanism. In their setup, bidders enter the auction at different times. They estimate the risk attitudes of buyers from the auction data. Using existing population estimates of risk preferences they provide quantitative predictions for the distribution of sellers' BIN prices. They find that including risk preferences can only partly account for agents' behavior: it improves the fit for buyers, but is not sufficient to explain sellers' deviations from equilibrium BIN prices.
In a follow-up study, Grebe, Ivanova-Stenzel, and Kroger (2006) invited students who have eBay experience to participate in auctions set up by the experimenters on the eBay website.
They elicited subjects' risk preferences using a lottery choice experiment conducted after a follow-up lottery experiment. They found that buyer behavior is still slightly biased towards overly frequent acceptance of the BIN price. Their conclusion is that risk aversion can only partly help in explaining buyer behavior but can not predict price setting behavior.
We propose a model that captures the information heterogeneity among bidders in the temporary BIN price auction, by assuming the BIN option is only available to one group of bidders. There are two groups of bidders in the model: early bidders and late bidders. Early bidders enter the auction in stage one and have observed the BIN price. Late bidders enter the auction in stage two only if no early bidder has accepted the BIN price. We solve the equilbrium bidders' strategies for an arbitrary number of risk neutral or risk averse bidders and continuous valuation distribution. The seller's optimal reserve price and BIN price were characterized when bidders are risk neutral. When bidders are risk averse, we show that with some appropriately chosen BIN price, the seller revenue can be higher in a BIN auction than in a second-price sealed-bid auction with the same reserve price. Further, the seller revenue increases as the number of early bidders decreases. These results may help explain the popularity of temporary BIN auctions in online auction sites such as eBay. and also provide an explanation of some experimental and field findings that the frequency of bidders accepting BIN price are often higher than the theoretical predictions when assuming all bidders are offered the BIN option. The model is described below.
The Model
We assume there is one indivisible good. The seller sets a reserve price r and a BIN price p. Stage two: There are n 2 late bidders ( 0 ≤ n 2 < n and n 1 + n 2 = n) entering the auction at stage two with no information about the BIN price Both early bidders and late bidders participate in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction with the reserve price r.
The highest bidder among them wins by paying the second highest bid.
Bidder's Equilibrium Strategy
Under CARA, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to equilibria of stage one If an early bidder accepts the BIN price, he competes only with the early bidders who also accept the BIN price. The probability that there are exactly k 1 − 1 early bidders
who also accept the BIN price is
Therefore, the expected payoff of an early bidder with valuation v i who accepts the BIN price is,
.
If a bidder rejects the BIN price, he loses the auction in stage one if any early bidder accepts the BIN price. If no bidder in stage one accepts the BIN price, then she participates in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction in stage two with n 1 early bidders and n 2 late bidders.
The auction enters the stage two with a probability of F n 1 (c). Since an early bidder rejects the BIN price only if his valuation is lower than the cutoff point c, the valuation of early bidders in stage two follow a new truncated distribution F e (v) under the support of [v, c] . Define the truncated distribution
with corresponding density function
In a second-price sealed bid auction, It is a weakly dominant strategy for bidders to bid their true valuation (Vickery,1961) . Therefore, we establish Lemma One. According to Lemma One, an early bidder wins the auction in stage two if all the other n 1 − 1 early bidder also reject the BIN price in stage one and his valuation is the higher than all other n 1 − 1 early bidders and all the n 2 late bidders. Therefore the expected payoff for an early bidder with valuation v i who rejects the BIN price in stage one is given by
A cutoff c * is a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium if π
. By the continuity of the payoff function, for the conjectured strategies to characterize an equilibrium in stage one, an early bidder's expected payoff from accepting the BIN price should be equal to his expected gain in stage two when his valuation equals to c. Therefore, the equilibrium cutoff c * satisfies π
Therefore,
Denote the certainty equivalent payment as δ α (v), such that a bidder with risk parameter
winning a standard second price auction with n bidders thus paying a random amount of max{r, y} where y is the second highest bid, and wining and paying the certain amount Define the left hand side of equation 1 as
and the right hand
and R(c) should have only one intersection when p ≤ c ≤ v.
Equation 3 becomes
Plug c = p and v into L(c)and R(c), we have
and
(c).
We first consider the case when p < δ α (v). Since u > 0,
From the definition of Q(x),
We have,
Further, n 1 = n − n 2 ≤ n and F (c) ≤ 1, we have
Hence,
Therefore, if

∂L(c) ∂c
, then L(c) and R(c) have one unique intersection in this domain.
∂R(c) ∂c
By the definition of δ α (v), we have
Differentiating equation 9 with respect to v, we have
Plug equation 9 into equation 10, we have
Therefore, equation 8 becomes
Further, n 1 = n − n 2 ≤ n 1 and F (c) ≤ 1. Therefore,
Equation 3 says
yielding,
which means
Further
L(p) = 0 and R(p) ≥ 0, and we have shown that R(v) < L(v) and
∂L(c) ∂c
there exists an unique c *
In the proof of case 1 we have shown that
. Therefore, for one equilibrium c *
Now we want to estabish that c * = v is an equilibrium cutoff when p = δ α (v).
Therefore, when a BIN price is set at p = δ α (v), there exists one unique cutoff equilibrium c * = v, which means only if a bidder's valuation is v, he is indifference between accepting a BIN price or rejecting it, otherwise he will always reject the BIN price.
, which suggests that it is always a dominant strategy for an early bidder to reject the BIN price.
In 
QED.
Theorem One establishes the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium cutoff strategy for the early bidders that an early bidder will accept the BIN price if his valuation is higher than or equal to a cutoff valuation and reject otherwise. Now we investigate how this equilibrium cutoff valuation will be affected by several factors, such as the number of early bidders, the BIN price, and bidders' risk aversion index.
Fixing the total number of bidders, when there are less early bidders in stage one, an early bidder with valuation higher than the cutoff valuation has a higher probability of winning the object. Meanwhile, the number of total bidders in stage two is the same thus the winning probability for an early bidder in stage two does not change. Therefore, its is more likely for an early bidder to accept the BIN price with less early bidders. 
The total number of the bidders n does not change, therefore, as n 1 increases, R(c) remains the same. Also, both L(p) and L (v) remain the same as n 1 increases. As we have shown in theorem one,
Therefore, if the slope L(c) decreases as n 1 increases, then c * increases as n 1 increases. 
. Therefore the intersection of L(c) and R(c) shifts rightwards as n 1 increases. This suggests that the unique equilibrium cutoff c * satisfying L(c) = R(c) increases as n 1 increases.
QED.
Let n 1 = n and n 2 = 0, this is equivalent to the case when all bidders are offered the BIN option. Proposition One implies that, since the cutoff valuation is higher in this case, a bidder is less likely to accept a BIN price compared with the case when only a small proportion of bidders are offered the BIN option. This may explain the high frequency of accepting BIN price in the data of empirical BIN auctions. 
where L(c) = u(c − p) Q((F (c)) and
In the proof of Theorem One, we have shown that for c
When p increases, L(c) decreases thus shifts rightward and R(c) remains the same. Therefore the intersection of L(c) and R(c) shifts rightward, which means c * increases.
QED.
A BIN option offers the bidder an opportunity to win the item with high certainty. Therefore a more risk averse bidder should be more likely to accept the BIN option compared with a less risk averse bidder. 
Since p < δ α i (v) < δ α i (c), we have Q(F (c)) > G(c).
Pick α 1 and a 2 such that α 1 < α 2 . Denote c 1 as the solution for
as the solution for L α 2 (c 2 ) = R α 2 (c 2 ).To show c * decreases in α, it is sufficient to show that
As shown in the proof of Theorem One, we have shown that for
For fixed x and y, and x < y, one can show that
1−e −αy is increasing in α. Therefore, c 1 )) .
which establishes that c 1 < c 2 . Therefore, when p < δ α (v),the unique symmetric equiblibrium cutoff c * ∈ [p, v] decreases as the bidders' risk index α increases.
Seller Revenue
In the previous section, we identified the equilibrium strategies for both early bidders and late bidders given the reserve price r and the BIN price p. To characterize the equilibrium for the entire auction, the seller's choice of reserve price and the BIN price must be analyzed.
We assume the seller is risk neutral and attaches no value to the good. The seller maximize his revenue by setting a reserve price r and a BIN price p assuming the bidders follow the equilibrium strategies characterized in Lemma One and Theorem One.
A seller's expected payment from a stage one bidder with valuation v i if the bidder accepts the buy pirce is F (c) ) .
The seller's expected payment from a stage one bidder if the bidder rejects the BIN price
A seller's expected revenue from a stage two bidder is
Therefore, a seller's expected revenue is, .
Thus the maximum revenue a risk neutral seller gains in a
Buy-It-Now auction facing n 1 risk neutral bidders and n 2 risk neutral bidders is the same as that in a second-price sealed-bid auction with n bidders where n = n 1 + n 2 .
Proof: When bidders are risk neutral, a second-price sealed-bid auction with the optimal reserve price is revenue maxmimzing (Myerson 1981) . Therefore, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the seller set the BIN price p > δ α (v) such that the early bidders will never accept the BIN price thus a second-price sealed-bid auction with n bidders will always occur.
In a second-price auction with n bidders, the expected seller revenue is,
Differentiating Π with respect to r, we have
Therefore, the seller's expected revenue is maximized by one unique r * such that r *
QED.
Theorem Two implies that when bidders are risk neutral, to maximize his revenue, a seller should not set a BIN price, or should set a BIN price high enough, such that no bidder will exercise the "Buy-It-Now" option. This is because if the BIN price p < δ 0 (v), therer is a positive possibility that the BIN price will be accepted by some bidder thus the revenue for the seller is p. However, in a second-price auction, the bidder with higest valuation wins and pays δ 0 (v), which is higher than p. To gain further insight into Theorem Two, we consider a special case demonstrate the equilibrium analysis for a special case with two risk neutral bidders in Example One. Proof: Suppose a seller sets the reserve price r and BIN price p at the beginning of the auction. Assume bidder one enters the auction at stage one. He faces two choices: 1) to accept the BIN price p and win the item immediately, or 2) to reject a bid then participate in a second price sealed-bid auction to compete with one late bidder.
Suppose bidder one uses a cutoff strategy c that he accepts the BIN price if v ≥ c and rejects the BIN price otherwise.
If bidder one purchases the item at the BIN price. His expected utility is
Bidder two has no chance to participate in the auction thus getting payoff 0.
If bidder one rejects the BIN price p, the auction becomes a standard second price auction with two bidders. Bidder one's expected payoff in stage two is
If bidder one's valuation exceeds his cutoff point, he will purchase the item at the BIN price in stage one and the auction ends. Therefore, if bidder one shows up in stage one, his valuation must be lower than his cutoff point c. Therefore, bidder two's expected payoff is
By the continuity of the payoff function, for the cutoff strategy to characterize an equilibrium in stage one, a stage one bidder's expected payoff by taking the BIN price in stage one should be equal to his expected gain in stage two when his valuation equals to the equilibrium cutoff c * , that is,
Suppose bidders are risk neutral, v = 0 and
The higher cutoff point c * h exceeds the highest bidder's valuation b, so we only consider the lower cutoff point c *
Given the characterized bidder's equilibrium cutoff strategy, a seller maximize his ex- 
Assume bidder one is using the cutoff point c * = b − b 2 − 2bp + r 2 and plug c * into Π then we have,
Solve for .Therefore
Perviously, we found that in order for the cutoff point to exist, we need p ≤ such that the the early bidder will never accept the BIN price thus a second-price sealed-bid auction always occur.
Up to now we have finished the equilibrium analysis of the two-stage Buy-It-Now auction when bidders are risk neutral. We find that when bidders are risk neutral, the seller will set a BIN price high enough so that no bidders will accept the BIN price. Therefore a two-stage Buy-It-Now auction does not yield higher seller revenue than a standard second-price sealedbid auction. However, bidders are often risk averse. Bidders' risk attitudes do not affect seller revenue in a standard.second-price sealed-bid auction (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) .
Meanwhile, as we have shown in Corollary Two, the more risk averse a bidder is, the more likely he is to accept a BIN price. Proposition Two established the condition under which a two-staged buy-it-now auction raises higher seller revenue than a standard second-price sealed-bid auction, when a seller faces risk averse bidders.
Corollary 
then bidder one will accept the BIN price. Hence the seller will by paid by p. 
, then no bidder will accept the BIN price and a second-price sealed-bid auction starts.thus the seller's expected
bidder one accepts the
Therefore, the seller's ex-ante expected revenue is higher when bidder's risk index is higher.
QED. Proof: Fix the total number of bidders n. Let 0 < n 1 < n 1 < n. Define the cutoff valuation as c * and c * when the number of early bidders is n 1 and n 1 respectively. Proposition
One shows that fixing the total number of bidders, the unique symmetric equilibrium cutoff Hence, for a fixed total number of bidders n, the seller's ex-ante expected revenue is higher when there are n 1 bidders compared with when there are n 1 > n 1 bidders. Therefore, the seller's revenue increases as the number of the early bidders n 1 decreases.
In this paper, we establish that when bidders are risk neutral or averse, if the seller sets the BIN price low enough, an early bidders will accept the BIN price only if his valuation is higher than a unique equilibrium cutoff valuation. Other things being equal, the cutoff valuation decreases as bidders' degree of risk aversion increases. The cutoff valuation also decreases as the number of early bidders decreases. When bidders are risk neutral, we characterize the equilibrium for both seller and bidders. We find that facing risk neutral bidders, a seller will set the BIN high enough, such that no bidder will accept the BIN price thus starting a second-price sealed-bid auction. Therefore the seller revenue with risk neutral bidders in a BIN auction is the same as in a second-price sealed-bid auction. This result is consistent with previous theoretical literature when assuming the BIN price is available to all bidders Although we did not characterize the equilibrium choices of the seller when facing risk averse bidders, we show that when bidders are risk averse, by setting an appropriate BIN price, the seller obtains a higher expected revenue in a two-stage BIN auction than in a standard second-price sealed-bid auction, and the expected revenue increases as the number of early bidders decreases. We can think of the case when all bidders are offered the BIN option as having n 1 = n and n 2 = 0. Therefore, the cutoff valuation is lower when only a small group of bidders are given the BIN option compared with when all bidders are offered the BIN option. This paper may also explain the reason why in the empirical data, the frequencies of bidders accepting BIN price are often higher than the theoretical predictions when assuming all bidders are offered the BIN option. Furthermore, seller revenue increases as less early bidders are offered the BIN option. Therefore, by assuming that the BIN option is available only to one group of bidders, the model proposed in this paper may help explain the popularity of temporary BIN auctions in online auction sites such as eBay, where bidders enter the auction after the BIN option disappears do not have information about the BIN price.
